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Abstract
Due to the environments in which they will operate, future autonomous systems
must be capable of reconfiguring quickly and safely following faults or environmental
changes. Past research has shown how, by considering autonomous systems to perform
phased missions, reliability analysis can support decision making by allowing compari-
son of the probability of success of different missions following reconfiguration. Binary
Decision Diagrams (BDDs) offer fast, accurate reliability analysis that could contribute
to real-time decision making. However, phased mission analysis using existing BDD
models is too slow to contribute to the instant decisions needed in time-critical situa-
tions. This paper investigates two aspects of BDD models that affect analysis speed:
variable ordering and quantification efficiency. Variable ordering affects BDD size,
which directly affects analysis speed. Here, a new ordering scheme is proposed for use
in the context of a decision making process. Variables are ordered before a mission
and reordering is unnecessary no matter how the mission configuration changes. Three
BDD models are proposed to address the efficiency and accuracy of existing models.
The advantages of the developed ordering scheme and BDD models are demonstrated
in the context of their application within a reliability analysis methodology used to
support decision making in an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.
Key words: Decision Support, Reliability analysis, Binary Decision Diagrams, Vari-
able ordering, Phased mission.
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1 Introduction
Systems that perform a sequence of tasks in order to achieve a specific objective are called
phased mission systems (PMS). The periods in which each of these successive tasks takes
place are known as phases and the series of phases as a whole is known as a mission. A
mission configuration is defined according to the tasks that must be completed, the time
duration of each task and the sequence of the tasks. A mission is successfully completed if
all of its phases are successfully completed. PMS are common in autonomous systems such
as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), satellites and MARS rovers and autonomous transporta-
tion. In practice, PMS such as those carried out by a UAV are non-repairable since repairs
are not possible during a mission.
The analysis of PMS is made complex by the dependencies that arise when considering the
phases in which components fail, since component failures could lead to loss of functionality
immediately or in a later phase, when the use of the system changes. Consideration of
mutually exclusive component failure modes also introduces dependencies into the analysis,
again making it more complex than the analysis of systems operating for single phases, which
contain components that fail in single failure modes1.
Past research has proposed the used of reliability analysis to support decision making for
PMS2. Mission reliability was proposed as a key decision variable to determine whether or
not a mission should continue in its present format. The reliability of a phased mission is
defined as the probability that all phases in the mission are completed without failure.
The initial unreliability, calculated before the mission begins, is used to help determine
whether the mission should start. An updated unreliability is calculated once the mission
is underway, whenever new information is obtained about the system. If the updated un-
reliability is unacceptably high, then other mission configurations must be considered to
eliminate potential risks.
In time-critical applications where alternative missions must be evaluated quickly in order
to allow a quick response to a changing situation, the strategy makes use of oﬄine and online
computation in order to maximize the analytical efficiency. The aim is to carry out as much
analysis as possible before the mission begins (oﬄine) and to hence reduce the amount of
computation required once the mission is underway (online), therefore minimizing the time
taken to make a decision3.
Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) models have been found to offer potential for performing
the real-time mission unreliability analysis that is needed in the decision making process,
due to their ability to provide accurate, fast updated unreliability analysis.
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Research into the use of BDDs to analyze PMS can be categorized as following two
approaches. In the first approach, presented in4 5, the BDDs representing individual phase
failures are rapidly connected together to represent the mission failure logic without account-
ing for dependencies, which are dealt with during the quantification process. The benefit
of this approach is that it allows quantification to begin almost immediately. However, the
quantification process itself is inefficient due to the fact that dependencies must be accounted
for during implementation. In the second approach, the BDDs are built in such a way that
the dependencies are considered during construction, meaning that the quantification process
is more efficient than in the first approach. However, the start of the quantification process
is delayed when compared to the first approach due to the more complex BDD construction
process. In5, researchers developed BDD construction rules using a phase algebra and made
changes to the quantification process to analyze the reliability of PMS using BDDs for the
first time. Work presented in6 7 improves the analysis efficiency of the BDD model in5 by
replacing modules, subtrees whose basic events do not occur anywhere else in the phased
mission fault tree, with module events in order to simplify the fault tree structure.7 8 ex-
tended the BDD model presented in5 to allow mission reliability to be analyzed for PMS
containing components that can fail in multiple modes.
Despite the research already conducted, further work is required in order to achieve
the speed of quantification needed to make real-time decisions when considering PMS with
multiple failure mode components. Tests on a set of benchmarks have indicated that the
second approach is the most efficient9. Therefore, the investigation presented here will focus
on this second approach.
BDD construction initially requires variable ordering and this can have a big impact
on BDD size10 11 and hence the time taken to perform quantitative analysis. Thus if the
reliability analysis of a PMS is to be used to support a decision making process, the variable
ordering scheme used to construct the BDD can directly affect how quickly decisions can be
made as to the best next course of action.
In this paper, an ordering strategy is developed specifically for application within a deci-
sion making process. Its aim is to allow the fastest possible calculation of updated unreliabil-
ity no matter what the future mission configuration. The work presented in this paper also
aims to address the requirement for fast, accurate calculation of updated unreliability, by
proposing two amendments to the BDD model presented in7 in order to correct inaccuracies
that have been highlighted in past research8 12, and proposing a more efficient quantification
method for the BDD model presented in8.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the fundamentals of
BDD and PMS analysis. Section 3 proposes a new ordering scheme, which has features that
make it ideal for use in a decision making process. Section 4 reviews existing BDD models
and proposes changes, which are intended to correct inaccuracies or improve the efficiency
of quantification. Section 5 demonstrates the impact of the variable ordering schemes and
BDD model developments using a set of randomly-generated PMS. Finally, conclusions are
drawn to highlight the potential impact of this research on the use of reliability analysis to
support decision making in a PMS.
2 Background
2.1 BDD
A BDD is a directed acyclic graph based on Shannon’s Decomposition13. Fault trees can be
converted into BDD format13 to allow efficient analysis of system failures. A BDD node is
represented by an if-then-else (ite) structure:
F = ite < x, F1, F0 >= x · F1 + x¯ · F0. (1)
If x occurs, then the BDD is traversed along the 1-branch to node F1, otherwise, it is
traversed along its 0-branch to node F0. The BDD is traversed in this way until a terminal
node, with a value of 0 or 1, is reached.
In order to construct a BDD, a variable ordering scheme is first defined. The variable
ordering can significantly impact the BDD size10, which is measured by the number of distinct
non-terminal nodes the BDD contains, and hence the time taken to perform analysis.
Two BDD nodes, F = ite < x, F1, F0 > and G = ite < y,G1, G0 >, where x appears
before y in the ordering scheme or the two variables are identical (x ≤ y), are combined as
follows:
F♦G =
ite < x, F1♦G,F0♦G > if x < yite < x, F1♦G1, F0♦G0 > if x = y (2)
where ♦ is the Boolean operator, AND(+) or OR(·).
Figure 1 shows the impact of two variable ordering schemes on BDD size for an example
fault tree, with the BDDs constructed using Equation 2.
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Figure 1: An illustration of the effect of variable ordering on BDD size.
2.2 Modelling PMS failures
A PMS performs a number of tasks in sequence in order to carry out a mission. To analyze
the reliability of the mission, fault trees are used to model the failure of the system to
perform each task. These fault trees can then be combined to model phases and overall
mission failure.
The logic expression for the failure of phase i, Fi, is represented by a fault tree whose basic
events are associated with a phase index subscript notation to represent the occurrence of the
component failure within a certain time duration and superscript notation to represent the
failure mode in which the component fails14. Using this notation, the failure of component
A in mode q between the start of the mission and the end of phase i is denoted as Aq0i. The
fault tree representing mission failure, Fmiss, is represented by an OR gate with inputs Fi,
where i = 1, 2, · · · , n and n is the total number of phases in the mission9.
The mission unreliability, Qmiss, is the top event probability of the fault tree representing
Fmiss:
Qmiss = P (Fmiss) = P (F1 + F2 + · · ·+ Fn). (3)
The probability of the conditional failure of phase i (failure in phase i conditional on the
success of the previous i− 1 phases), P (ph)i, is calculated using the probability of F1 +F2 +
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· · ·+ Fi 6.
P (ph1) = P (F1),
P (phi) = P (F1 + F2 + · · ·+ Fi)− P (F1 + F2 + · · ·+ Fi−1).
(4)
In order to perform the analysis efficiently, BDDs can be constructed to represent the
logic expression for phase and mission failures with dependencies between variables dealt
with as necessary during construction and quantification5 7 8.
3 A Novel Variable Ordering Scheme
3.1 The Motivation for the Best Order Interleaving Scheme (BOI)
When analyzing a PMS, a variable will contain information about which component it relates
to and in which failure mode and phase it fails. Therefore, variables must be ordered at three
levels15 11: component, phase and failure mode level. There are two types of phase ordering:
forward ordering considers variables in order of their phase index and backward ordering
considers variables according to the reverse of their phase index16. The only requirement
for failure mode ordering is that the ordering of failure modes in all phases is consistent.
Component level ordering is the most complex aspect of variable ordering since the number of
components, if large, can lead to many alternative variable lists. Several different component-
level ordering schemes have been investigated and can be applied to mission failure fault trees
where phase and failure mode indices are neglected (referred to as ‘don’t care’ fault trees),
as shown in Appendix A.
However, when events (such as component failures or changing environmental conditions)
render the reliability of the current mission unacceptable and make it obligatory for mis-
sion reconfiguration to take place, it is necessary to assess and compare the reliability of
alternative missions that involve different functionality from the original configuration. This
changing system functionality will lead to a requirement for different task fault trees to be
considered during the analysis. These fault trees will have different structures to those orig-
inally considered and may also contain different basic events. Therefore, if using existing
ordering schemes, variables must be reordered given the alternative mission configuration,
BDDs constructed for the relevant task failure fault trees and the completed mission phases
and analysis of the proposed mission phases conducted. This is potentially inefficient, since
the variable ordering and BDD construction must be carried out online, while the mission is
in progress, as shown in Figure 2, before quantification can be carried out.
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Figure 2: Illustration of the source of the efficiency advantage of BOI over existing ordering
schemes, considering the steps required to compute the unreliability of new mission config-
urations after m phases of the original mission.
Ideally, if taking advantage of the oﬄine-online strategy introduced in3, online compu-
tation and analysis time would be minimized by carrying out as much analysis as possible
oﬄine. The Best Order Interleaving Scheme (BOI) is introduced in order to allow variable
ordering and BDD construction to be carried out oﬄine, before the mission begins, as shown
in Figure 2. The goal is to promote efficiency and to ensure that a decision can be made
about the best next course of action without unnecessary delay.
BOI arranges variables according to the structures of the fault trees representing the
failures of all tasks that a PMS is capable of rather than the structure of the fault tree
representing mission failure. Variables are ordered before the mission starts and the variable
order list remains unchanged no matter how the mission configuration changes. The princi-
ples of the BOI scheme allow the online-oﬄine strategy to be adopted and hence maximize
the amount of computation that is carried out oﬄine. This will save a large amount of effort
to re-order variables and construct BDDs when performing reliability analysis for alternative
mission configurations when the mission is underway.
3.2 Application of BOI
BOI uses an interleaving technique, which was first introduced in17 to provide an optimal
order list for multiple output combinatorial circuits. The technique combines the variable
order lists that lead to the smallest BDD size for each task failure fault tree to obtain an
overall list for all possible variables.
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The ordering schemes described in Appendix A can be classified into two groups according
to the principles followed when applying them: group 1: Schemes 1, 5, 6, and 8 and group
2: Schemes 2, 3, 4, and 7.
In the group 1 schemes, variables are ordered in a global range according to an assigned
value of certain parameters. In the group 2 schemes, variables are explored in a depth-
first manner, i.e., variables below a gate are fully allocated before the exploration of another
gate. This common principle of group 2 schemes provides a basis for applying the interleaving
technique. Therefore, the BOI scheme uses group 2 schemes to obtain optimal variable order
lists for individual task failure fault trees so that they can be integrated using the interleaving
technique.
The principles of the BOI scheme are:
1. Identify task failure fault trees for the PMS.
2. Use the four schemes to analyze each of the task fault trees, thus obtaining 4 BDDs
for each fault tree.
3. Compare the sizes of the 4 BDDs and select the optimal ordering scheme for each,
i.e., that which leads to the smallest BDD size. Cache the optimal order list and the
smallest BDD size for each fault tree.
4. Prioritize the order lists according to decreasing size of the smallest BDD for each fault
tree.
5. Interleave variables in the order lists using the interleaving technique described below
until all variables are included in the final list17:
(a) For the first variable in the order list, if the variable is already in the final list,
then do nothing; otherwise, insert it at the beginning of the final list.
(b) For the other variables in the order list, check whether the variable, (assume
without loss of generality) A, is in the final list, if so, do nothing; otherwise,
identify the position in the final list of the variable B that is immediately in front
of variable A in the current order list and insert variable A immediately after
variable B in the final list.
Consider for instance a system that can perform 4 tasks. The fault trees representing the
failure of the system to complete these tasks are shown in Figure 3. In a mission, MA, the
system is required to perform task 1, task 2 and task 3 in sequence. The failure of mission
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MA is represented by the fault tree in Figure 4, where the variables associated with the fault
tree basic events encode information relating to the phase (superscript) and failure mode
(subscript) in which a component fails. For example, Aq0i represents component A failing in
failure mode q between the start of the mission and the end of mission phase i.
Figure 3: Fault trees representing the failure of a system to complete 4 tasks.
Although task 4 is not included in the mission, variables are ordered according to the
fault tree structures of all tasks the system can perform, as shown in Figure 3, so that when
considering an alternative mission that includes task 4, there is no need to re-order variables
or reconstruct BDDs for previous successfully completed phases.
Applying the four schemes to each of the task failure fault trees leads to the following
order lists and associated BDD size for each fault tree: Task 1: B < A < E with size 8,
Task 2: D < A < B < C with size 4, Task 3: C < E < A < B < D with size 6, Task
4: F < G with size 2. Thus, the order lists are considered in the sequence Task 1, Task 3,
Task 2 and Task 4. The final variable order list is created as follows. First, the order list
of Task 1 is copied to the final list to give B < A < E. Variables from Task 3 that are not
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Figure 4: The fault tree representing the failure of the system to complete mission MA.
yet in the final list must then be added. C is the first variable in the order list for Task 3.
Therefore, it is allocated at the start of the final list. E, A, and B are already in the final
list, meaning no action is required. The final variable, D, appears after B in Task 3 so it
is inserted immediately after B in the final list to obtain C < B < D < A < E. The final
variable order list is complete after the variables from Task 2 and Task 4 have been added:
F < G < C < B < D < A < E.
4 Improving the Efficiency of PMS Reliability Analysis
Using BDDs
Two BDD models have been developed to address the dependencies that appear in PMS
with multiple failure mode components during BDD construction. The DEP-BDD model
presented in7 takes account of the dependencies that arise due to the mission phases and
multiple failure modes using dependence and phase algebra. The model has been shown to
give inaccurate results8 12 but instead of correcting the DEP-BDD model, the researchers
who discovered the inaccuracy developed a new model, which uses a forward phase ordering
for BDD construction and an Implicant Tree method for quantification. This model will be
referred to here as the Forward-BDD model.
The remainder of this section details suggested improvements to existing PMS BDD
models:
• Two amendments are proposed to the DEP-BDD analysis to correct the previously-
observed inaccuracies;
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• A more efficient quantification method is proposed to replace the quantification method
of the Forward-BDD model.
4.1 Amending and Improving the DEP-BDD Model
4.1.1 Analytical Inaccuracies
The failure probability of the mission modelled by the fault tree given in Figure 5 can be
shown to be18:
P (Top) = P (A201) + P (A
1
02). (5)
Figure 5: Example mission fault tree.
Using the DEP-BDD model (as presented in Appendix B), variables in the example fault
tree shown in Figure 5 are ordered as: A102 < A
2
01 < A
1
01 and the constructed BDD is shown
in Figure 6.
Figure 6: The BDD representing the mission failure conditions show in Figure 9 obtained
using the DEP-BDD model.
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The root node probability evaluated using the DEP-BDD evaluation, Equation 15, is:
P (Top) = P (A201) + P (A
1
01) + P (A
1
02), (6)
which is incorrect. The inaccuracy arises due to the node N1, which is redundant12.
In Section 4.1.2 and Section 4.1.3, two modifications are proposed in order to correct
the DEP-BDD analysis by eliminating redundant nodes from the BDD and hence allowing
accurate quantification to be performed. These two modified models are referred to here as
Model 1 and Model 2 and are quantified using the same method that is used in the original
DEP-BDD model.
4.1.2 Applying a Reduction Process (Model 1)
Model 1 retains the variable ordering of the DEP-BDD model and corrects the quantifica-
tion process by adding a reduction process to simplify the construction of two nodes when
variables relate to the same component but different failure modes to ensure BDDs remain
in a compact format.
• The calculation of L1 in the DEP-BDD model is modified so that L1 is the first node
with a variable relating to a component other than x or relating to the same component
and failure mode as x encountered on the traversal down the 0-branches of the node
starting from G. This is because x = 1 implies variables related to another failure
mode of the same component must be equal to 0 whereas this is not true for other
cases.
• The calculation of L0 can be simplified to G0, since using the construction rules of
Model 1, the 0-branch of node G always links two variables that relate to different
failure modes of the same component or that relate to different components, meaning
that when x = 0, L0 = (y · G1 + y¯ · G0)x=0 = (0 · G1 + 1 · G0)x=0 = (G0)x=0 = G0
always applies.
• A reduction is carried out when computing the combination of two nodes whose vari-
ables relate to an identical component and failure mode. The process involves travers-
ing down the 0-branch of the newly-created node and replacing any node with a variable
relating to an identical component and failure mode as the newly-created node by its
0-branch.
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This reduction process eliminates redundant nodes in the BDD, keeping the BDD in a
simplified form. Since there are no redundant nodes, the DEP-BDD quantification process
described in7 will yield accurate results. The speed of the analysis should also reduce due
to the reduction in the BDD size.
4.1.3 Amending Variable Ordering (Model 2)
Model 2 corrects the DEP-BDD analysis by changing the variable ordering and adopting the
same L1 and L0 calculation as used in Model 1. Model 2 requires the variables to be ordered
firstly according to failure mode level and then phase level. This is the only change from the
Model 1 analysis. However, by considering failure mode level first, the phase dependency
operation automatically eliminates redundant nodes from the BDD. No additional reduction
process is needed.
In common with Model 1, the elimination of redundant nodes in the BDD when it is
constructed using Model 2 means that applying the DEP-BDD quantification process will
yield accurate results.
4.1.4 Example
For the fault tree shown in Figure 5, the BDD constructed using Model 1 before reduction
is shown in Figure 6. Traversing the BDD from N3 along its 0-branch, it can be seen that
the variable of node N1, A101, relates to the same failure mode of the same component as
the variable of the root node N3, A102. This means that N1 is a redundant node and thus is
replaced by its 0-branch, 0, leading to the BDD shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7: BDD obtained using Model 1.
Using the DEP-BDD quantification process gives:
P (Top) = P (A201) + P (A
1
02). (7)
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Using Model 2, the variables are ordered as: A201 < A
1
02 < A
1
01, with A
2
01 being listed earlier
than A102 because Model 2 considers dependency between failure modes before dependency
between phases. Using the same construction rules as those given for Model 1, the BDD
shown in Figure 8 is obtained and the DEP-BDD quantification process gives:
P (Top) = P (A201) + P (A
1
02). (8)
Figure 8: BDD obtained using Model 2 and Forward-BDD model.
It can be seen by comparing Equation 5 to Equation 8 that Models 1 and 2 correct the
observed inaccuracy of the DEP-BDD model and yield accurate results following quantifica-
tion.
4.2 Amending the Forward-BDD method (Model 3)
The Forward-BDD model8 was developed as an accurate alternative to the DEP-BDD for
analyzing PMS with multiple failure mode components. Variables are ordered according to
failure mode level before phase level and it uses forward phase level ordering.
4.2.1 The Forward-BDD Model
The Forward-BDD model uses the following rules to compute the operation between two
nodes, F = ite < x, F1, F0 > and G = ite < y,G1, G0 >. Suppose that x ≤ y: F G =
ite < x, F1 G1, F0 G0 > x = y
ite < x, F1 G,F0 G > cp(x) 6= cp(y)
ite < x, F1  L1, F0 G > cp(x) = cp(y), fm(x) 6= fm(y)
ite < x, F1 G1, F0 G > cp(x) = cp(y), fm(x) = fm(y)
(9)
where L1 = (G0)x=1 is the first node with variable relating to a component other than x
encountered during a traversal down the 0-branch of the BDD starting from G.
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For a newly-created node as shown in Figure 9, a reduction rule is introduced to remove
redundant nodes8. If cp(x) = cp(z), fm(x) = fm(z), and G1 = I1, then node G is replaced
by its success branch G0.
Figure 9: A general node in a PMS BDD.
For the fault tree in Figure 5, variables are first ordered by backward failure mode and
then forward phase index: A201 < A
1
01 < A
1
02. By applying the Forward-BDD construction
rules and reduction process, the BDD obtained is the same as that obtained using Model 2,
as shown in Figure 8.
The Implicant Tree method developed in8 allows quantification of the BDDs constructed
using the Forward-BDD model by constructing a dependency free data structure, the Impli-
cant Tree.
However, the Implicant Tree is a new data structure that must be constructed from
the BDD prior to quantification. This is likely to add significant computation time to the
quantification procedure, particularly when the BDD is large. This is not a desirable feature
for a phased mission analysis technique that is to be used as part of a decision making
process. Therefore, a new method is developed here to quantify the Forward-BDDs directly.
The efficiency of the proposed quantification method is demonstrated in Section 5.1.
4.2.2 Proposed Quantification Method for Forward-BDDs (Model 3)
In Model 3, the 1-branch always links two variables that relate to different components and
the 0-branch can either link two variables that relate to different components or two variables
that relate to the same component due to the Forward-BDD construction rules8.
The proposed quantification method is based on the phase algebra in Table 1, which is
used to deal with dependencies across phases5 and the dependency algebra in Table 2, which
is introduced to deal with dependencies between multiple failure modes7, of two variables
relating to the same component.
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Table 1: Phase algebra for two variables (Ap0i and A
p
0j) relating to the same component and
failure mode but with different phase index (i < j)
Ap0i · Ap0j = Ap0i Ap0i · Ap0j = Ap0j
Ap0i + A
p
0j = A
p
0i A
p
0i + A
p
0j = A
p
0j
Ap0i + A
p
0i = 1 A
p
0i · Ap0j = 0
Table 2: Dependency algebra for two variables (Ap0i and A
q
0j) relating to the same component
but different failure modes (p 6= q).
Ap0i · Aq0j = 0 Ap0i · Aq0j = Aq0j
Ap0i · Aq0j = Ap0i Ap0i + Aq0j = Aq0j
Ap0i + A
q
0j = A
p
0i A
p
0i + A
q
0j = A
p
0i + A
q
0j
For a node G shown in Figure 9, the quantification method is given by: P (G) =
p(x) ∗ P (G1) + [1− p(x)] ∗ P (G0) case 1
P (G0) + p(x) ∗ [P (G1)− P (I1)] case 2
P (G0) + p(x) ∗ [P (G1)− P ((I0)x=1)] case 3
(10)
where ∗ is the probability multiplication, (I0)x=1, is the first node with variable relating to
a component other than x encountered during the traversal down the 0-branch of node G0
and the conditions relating to each case are:
case 1: cp(x) 6= cp(z)
case 2: cp(x) = cp(z) and fm(x) = fm(z)
case 3: cp(x) = cp(z) and fm(x) 6= fm(z)
The proof of Equation 10 is given below. Since cp(x) 6= cp(y) in all cases, P (x · G1) =
p(x) ∗ P (G1). Three cases must then be considered.
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1. When cp(x) 6= cp(z):
P (G) = P (x ·G1 + x¯ ·G0)
= P (x ·G1) + P (x¯ ·G0)
= p(x) ∗ P (G1) + p(x¯) ∗ P (G0)
= p(x) ∗ P (G1) + (1− p(x)) ∗ P (G0)
2. When cp(x) = cp(z) and fm(x) = fm(z),
P (x¯ ·G0) = P (x¯ · (z · I1 + z¯ · I0))
= P (x¯ · z · I1 + x¯ · z¯ · I0)
(according to the phase algebra, x¯ · z = z − x · z
and x¯ · z¯ = z¯)
= P ((z − x · z) · I1 + z¯ · I0)
= P (z · I1 + z¯ · I0− x · z · I1)
(according to the phase algebra, x · z = x )
= P (G0− x · I1)
= P (G0)− p(x) ∗ P (I1)
Here, (I1)x=1 = I1 always holds because the variable of I1 is always different to x
8.
Substituting P (x¯ ·G0) into P (G) gives:
P (G) = P (x ·G1 + x¯ ·G0)
= P (x ·G1) + P (x¯ ·G0)
= p(x) ∗ P (G1) + P (G0)− p(x) ∗ P (I1)
= P (G0) + p(x) ∗ [P (G1)− P (I1)]
3. When cp(x) = cp(z) and fm(x) 6= fm(y),
P (x¯ ·G0) = P (x¯ · (z · I1 + z¯ · I0))
= P (x¯ · z · I1 + x¯ · z¯ · I0)
(according to the dependence algebra, x¯ · z = z and
x¯ · z¯ = z¯ − x · z¯)
= P (z · I1 + z¯ · I0− x · z¯ · I0)
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(according to the dependence algebra, x · z¯ = x)
= P (G0− x · I0)
= P (G0)− p(x) ∗ p((I0)x=1)
Substituting P (x¯ ·G0) into P (G) gives:
P (G) = P (x ·G1 + x¯ ·G0)
= P (x ·G1) + P (x¯ ·G0)
= p(x) ∗ P (G1) + P (G0)− p(x) ∗ P ((I0)x=1)
= P (G0) + p(x) ∗ (P (G1)− P ((I0)x=1))
4.2.3 Example
Quantification of the BDD shown in Figure 8 using the proposed quantification needs only
to consider the case when cp(x) = cp(z) and fm(x) 6= fm(z) and gives the same result as
Equation 5:
P (top) = P (A201) + P (A
1
02). (11)
5 Performance Results and Comparison
The accuracy of the DEP-BDD model and the Forward-BDD model were compared in8,
where it was shown that the quantification results obtained using the Forward-BDD model
were accurate, unlike those obtained using the DEP-BDD model. The mission failure prob-
abilities obtained using the three new models presented here are identical to those obtained
using the Forward-BDD model, thus the four models are compared solely in terms of ana-
lytical efficiency.
Two efficiency measures are used to assess the performance of the BDD models: the size
of the BDD representing mission failure (number of BDD nodes), and the mission analysis
time. This mission analysis time is considered in the context of mission reconfiguration,
when updated failure probabilities must be calculated for a number of alternative mission
configurations and a decision made as to the best next course of action. Since this is the
case, the time taken to order variables and to construct and quantify mission failure BDDs
must be included. In order to allow decisions to be made quickly, the shorter the mission
analysis time, the better.
Software was written to generate benchmark fault trees of varying size and structure
using the method presented in19. The structural features of a fault tree are mainly decided
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by the following parameters: the minimum and maximum number of gates, the percentage
of gate inputs in each fault tree layer and the maximum number of component failure modes.
A number of fault tree sets were produced and combined at random in order to create 100
mission profiles, which could then be used to test the efficiency of the four BDD models.
5.1 Comparison of Model Efficiency
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Figure 10: The percentage of additional BDD sizes generated using Model 1 and Model 2
compared with the BDD sizes generated using Model 3 and Forward-BDD model
Table 3 shows the number of missions for which each model produces a BDD smaller than
those produced by the other models. Model 3 shares its BDD construction rules with the
Forward-BDD model and therefore shares its BDD sizes. These models are seen to generate
smaller BDDs than the other two models for 59 PMS. For the other 41 cases, the smallest
BDD is produced by either Model 1 or Model 2. Figure 10 shows a comparison of the size
of the BDDs generated by Model 1 and Model 2 relative to those generated by Model 3 and
the Forward-BDD Model for each of the PMS considered.
Table 3: Performance comparison of BDD models in terms of BDD sizes
BDD model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 and Forward-BDD
No. of missions 23 18 59
Table 4 shows the number of missions for which the analysis of each model takes less time
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Figure 11: The percentage of additional analysis time generated using Model 1, Model 2 and
Forward-BDD model compared with the analysis time generated using Model 3
than the analysis of the same mission using other models. In 51 cases, the fastest analysis
comes when using Model 3. For the other 49 cases, Model 1 or Model 2 result in the fastest
analysis (the Forward-BDD Model never results in the fastest analysis). Figure 11 shows a
comparison of the time taken to perform the analysis when using Model 1, Model 2 and the
Forward-BDD Model relative to the time taken when using Model 3 for each of the PMS
considered.
Therefore, improved efficiency can be expected when using Model 1, 2 and 3. Of the
three developed BDD models, Model 3 can be seen to generally perform better than Model
1 and Model 2, since it leads to the smallest analysis time for around 50% of the missions.
Table 4: Performance comparison of BDD models in terms of analysis time
BDD model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Forward-BDD
No. of missions 30 19 51 0
Table 5 gives the efficiency improvement of the three developed BDD models over the
Forward-BDD model computed by the average reduction in mission analysis time. The time
taken to perform analysis when using the Forward-BDD model is longer in all cases than the
time taken to perform analysis when using the other models. All of the new BDD models
show greatly reduced analysis time in comparison to the Forward-BDD model. A particularly
noteworthy result is seen for Model 3, which, despite using the same BDD structure as the
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Forward BDD model, results in an analysis time that is on average 90.09% less than that
required for the Forward BDD model.
Table 5: Analysis of the efficiency improvement (percentage of time reduced) of the three
developed BDD models over the Forward-BDD model
BDD models Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Average improvement 75.28% 54.12% 90.09%
5.2 Comparison of Variable Ordering Schemes
Since Model 3 proved to be the most efficient BDD model for the tested phased missions,
it is used to analyze the efficiency of the variable ordering schemes. Using Model 3, each
ordering scheme is used during the construction of mission failure BDDs for the 100 test
mission profiles. Table 6 shows the number of missions for which each scheme produced
the smallest BDD and also the number of missions for which each scheme resulted in the
lowest mission analysis time. The table shows that it is possible for any scheme to produce
the smallest BDD. When considering analysis time, Scheme 6 and Scheme 8 never result in
the lowest time, since the variable ordering time required when applying these schemes takes
longer than that required when applying the other ordering schemes. Scheme 5 results in the
smallest mission failure BDD in 30 out of the 100 cases and the lowest analysis time in 48 out
of the 100 cases. Therefore, Scheme 5 would appear to be most likely to offer performance
advantages in terms of reduced analysis time when compared to the other ordering schemes.
It should give the greatest chance of producing the lowest analysis times when calculating
updated probabilities.
Table 6: Performance comparison of the nine ordering schemes measured by size of BDD
and analysis time for mission unreliability
Scheme 1 Scheme 2 Scheme 3 Scheme 4 Scheme 5 Scheme 6 Scheme 7 Scheme 8 BOI
BDD size 4 4 10 4 30 10 19 16 3
Analysis time 8 11 22 6 48 0 4 0 1
5.3 The Performance of BOI
The proposed BOI scheme can be seen to perform inefficiently in comparison to the other
ordering schemes when analyzing mission unreliability. However, this scheme was specially
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developed with a view to enabling the efficient use of the reliability analysis of PMS in
a decision making tool. It is expected to improve analysis efficiency when calculating the
unreliability of possible alternative missions that must be considered when the unreliability
of the current mission drops to an unacceptable level and alternatives must be considered.
In particular, this improvement in analysis time is likely to be observed when calculating
the unreliability of the first phase that involves performing a task that was not a part of the
original mission, since the fault tree representing the failure to complete this task is most
likely to contain basic events that do not appear in the current mission fault tree. This
means that variable re-ordering is required before any further analysis can be performed and
that the analysis of the phases completed up to the current point in the mission must be
repeated for this new ordering (as illustrated in Figure 2).
Table 7 shows the average efficiency advantages (percentage reduction in analysis time)
derived when using BOI in preference to the other ordering schemes to analyze the unre-
liability of the first altered phase, in an alternative mission configuration for two different
situations: when the first altered phase is the third phase in the alternative mission and when
it is the penultimate phase. The average efficiency advantage of the BOI scheme over the
other schemes varies from 39.33% to 95.13%. In all cases, BOI leads to a lower unreliability
analysis time for the first altered phase in the alternative mission, thus demonstrating the
potential for its use in supporting fast decision making in PMS.
Table 7: Average relative advantage of BOI compared to the eight ordering scheme when
analyzing the first altered phase in the alternative mission
Scheme 1 Scheme 2 Scheme 3 Scheme 4 Scheme 5 Scheme 6 Scheme 7 Scheme 8
The third phase 47.96% 40.19% 39.33% 69.95% 48.40% 83.21% 76.44% 95.13%
The penultimate phase 45.42% 49.13% 44.04% 56.62% 43.47% 63.21% 64.23% 75.62%
6 Case Study
In order to further demonstrate the efficiency advantage of the proposed BDD Model 3 in
comparison to the other models, and the advantage of the developed BOI scheme within
the context of decision making processes for a real world application, an example search
and rescue (SAR) mission to be completed by a UAV is considered and different application
scenarios modelled by varying mission configurations are tested.
The UAV is capable of performing six tasks and the failure of each task is represented by
a modularised fault tree whose structure is detailed in6. The six fault trees have structure
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information shown in Table 8. It is assumed that the highest acceptable mission unreliability
is 0.001. If the unreliability exceeds this value for a mission then alternative missions will
considered.
Table 8: Fault tree information for the UAV SAR mission case study6
Task fault tree No. gates (OR, AND) No. events (Non-repeated) Max. failure mode
FT1 (Takeoff) 17 (9,8) 19 2
FT2 (Climb) 14 (8,6) 14 2
FT3 (Cruise and Search) 15 (8,8) 22 2
FT4 (Cruise and Detect Submarine) 15 (8,9) 27 2
FT5 (Descend) 14 (8,6) 14 2
FT6 (Land) 17 (9,8) 20 2
The six tasks are arranged in specific sequence and frequency to form a mission config-
uration. The initial SAR mission failure is shown by the fault tree in Figure 12. Suppose
failure probabilities of the basic events follow an exponential distribution20 with randomly
generated failure rates of the order 10−6 per hour.
Figure 12: The fault tree representing the failure of the UAV to complete the initial SAR
mission
Before the mission starts (off-line), enough time is allowed to analyse the mission unrelia-
bility using different ordering schemes and BDD models to select the optimal ones, i.e. those
that have the highest potential to provide the most efficient analysis of the updated mission
unreliability when the the UAV is in flight. Table 9 shows that for every ordering scheme
(comparing the horizontal data), the BDD constructed using Model 3 and the forward-BDD
model are smaller than those constructed using Model 1 and Model 2. The analysis per-
23
formed using Model 3 is always faster than using the other models and thus is selected for
future updated mission reliability analysis. The calculated mission unreliability is 0.00016
which is lower than the acceptable threshold of 0.001 and thus the UAV starts the initial
mission.
Table 9: Analysis results for the original SAR mission configuration in the off-line stage
Parameter BDD size Mission analysis time(s)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Forward-BDD Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Forward-BDD
Scheme 1 1309 1342 922 922 0.5 0.6 0.5 2.9
Scheme 2 2496 2496 1422 1422 2.5 2.5 0.7 3.4
Scheme 3 2496 2457 1422 1422 2.5 2.5 0.7 3.3
Scheme 4 2820 2714 1791 1791 2.7 2.7 0.8 6.6
Scheme 5 1650 1642 1084 1084 0.8 0.8 0.5 3.2
Scheme 6 6349 6321 1759 1759 11.2 11.2 2.2 19.7
Scheme 7 2766 2741 1788 1788 2.6 2.6 0.9 5.9
Scheme 8 1314 1314 873 873 0.6 0.6 0.5 2.7
BOI 2020 2034 1012 1012 1.8 1.9 0.5 2.8
Suppose during the performance of phase 2 of the SAR mission, the existence of hostile
armed submarines is detected which will lead to potential threat that affects a future phase.
This means the probabilities of basic events representing the occurrence of an external threat
in a later phase fault tree will be updated to a larger value. After a calculation of current
mission unreliability based on updated variable probabilities, the mission unreliability is
proved to be too high to accept (> 0.001) and thus the original SAR cannot be continued.
Therefore, two alternative mission configurations (as shown in Figure 13) are considered to
ensure the success of the mission objective.
Both of the missions involve a new task failure fault tree (FT4). Due to the requirement
for an instant decision to be made when it is no longer safe to carry on the current mission, it
is necessary to calculate the unreliability of the first altered phase and the entire alternative
mission14. It is seen from Table 10 that the analysis speed when using the BOI scheme is
faster than when using the other schemes (comparing vertically).
The results of the case study again support the testing results presented in 5, i.e. Model
3 is more efficient than the other models in terms of analysis speed. For this case study, the
BOI scheme is an optimal choice to calculate the unreliability of the first altered phase when
an immediate decision is required as to the best next course of action.
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Figure 13: The fault trees representing the failure of the UAV to complete the 1st or the 2nd
alternative mission
Table 10: Exact analysis for two mission alternatives
Parameter BDD size Analysis time(s)
Mission Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Scope Phase 3 Mission Phase 3 Mission Phase 3 Mission Phase 3 Mission
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Forward-BDD Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Forward-BDD
Scheme 1 891 1026 896 1134 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.8
Scheme 2 1375 1519 1375 1851 0.3 1.2 0.3 1.7
Scheme 3 1375 1519 1375 1851 0.3 1.2 0.3 1.7
Scheme 4 1635 1863 1685 2038 0.9 1.6 0.9 1.9
Scheme 5 1048 1233 1124 1404 0.2 0.7 0.3 1.0
Scheme 6 2109 3600 1987 3186 1.6 15.1 1.4 10.3
Scheme 7 2157 2329 1542 2043 1.4 2.8 1.2 2.3
Scheme 8 895 958 932 1081 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.8
BOI 937 1089 960 1190 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.1
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7 Conclusion
If a reliability analysis methodology is to be used to support real-time decision making for
systems operating phased missions in changing mission environments, it is crucial that the
applied methodology can analyze PMS quickly and accurately.
The construction of BDDs initially requires variables to be ordered and how they are
ordered can greatly affect the sizes of the constructed BDDs. This paper has tested the
efficiency of eight ordering schemes by applying them to ‘don’t care’ fault trees represent-
ing PMS failures. A new ordering scheme, BOI, is proposed, which is designed to work
efficiently within the decision making process described in the literature. It is specifically
developed to enable updated reliability analysis, which is performed when alternative mis-
sion configurations must be considered while a mission is in progress, to be performed more
quickly.
When there is no time constraint for identifying an appropriate mission alternative (and
hence no great urgency to the calculation of mission unreliability), Scheme 5 appears to
be the best choice of ordering scheme to use in the analysis, as it has shown to have the
highest chance of producing the smallest BDD sizes for mission failure and the lowest mis-
sion unreliability analysis time for the tested missions. When time is limited (meaning the
configuration of the next phase needs to be decided almost immediately), and particularly in
the case when variable reordering would be necessary, the BOI scheme is recommended to be
used since it avoids the need for variable reordering and repeated analysis of phases shared
by the original and alternative missions, so that the unreliability of the first altered phase
of the mission alternative can be quickly computed and an acceptable mission configuration
can be decided in the shortest possible time.
In this paper, after reviewing the DEP-BDD analysis, two amendments, Model 1 and
Model 2, have been proposed, which correct the previously-observed inaccuracies. The
Forward-BDD model is improved by introducing a more efficient quantification method.
As shown by results in Section 5 and the case study, all of the three developed models
offer much faster analysis for the PMS with multiple failure modes than the Forward-BDD
model. The analysis efficiency advantage of Model 3 over the Forward-BDD model is purely
down to the improvement in efficiency that comes from the proposed quantification method,
since they use the same BDD construction rules.
Model 3 (or the Forward-BDD model) was shown to have a higher chance of obtaining
smaller BDDs compared with the two models that are based on DEP-BDD analysis. Of
the three new models, Model 3 was seen to result in the highest percentage reduction in
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mission analysis time when compared to the other two models for the missions tested. This
means that Model 3 would appear to be the most promising to be used when performing
reliability analysis for PMS containing components with multiple failure modes to help the
system make real-time decisions as to its next course of action in dynamic, rapidly changing
mission environments.
Appendix A: Variable Ordering Schemes
Modified Top-down Ordering (Scheme 1)21
Variables are ordered as they appear in the ‘don’t care’ fault tree in a top-down, left-right
arrangement, with priority given to variables that appear in higher levels of the fault tree.
For tied variables, the one that occurs most frequently is ordered earlier.
Modified Depth-first Ordering (Scheme 2)2215
The ‘don’t’ care fault tree is considered to be made up of sub-trees, each of which is fully
explored in turn (from left to right as they appear in the fault tree) according to Scheme 1.
Modified Priority Depth-first Ordering (Scheme 3)19
Scheme 3 is a modified version of Scheme 2. Instead of considering gates from left to right
as they appear in the ‘don’t care’ fault tree, scheme 3 considers gates with only event inputs
before those with both event and gate inputs.
Modified Leaves Depth-first Ordering (Scheme 4)2219
Scheme 4 is also a modified version of Scheme 2. A gate is considered first if it:
1. Contains the smallest number of leaves (total number of basic events beneath the gate).
In case of ties, then
2. Contains the smallest number of unconsidered leaves.
Variables that occur most frequently appear earlier in the variable order list.
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Non-Dynamic Top-down Weighted Ordering (Scheme 5)
11
A variable in the ‘don’t care’ fault tree is listed before others if it has:
1. The biggest contribution weight to the top event (the top event is given weight 1; the
weight of each gate is then equally distributed between its inputs). Weights of repeated
variables are added together. In case of ties, then
2. The smallest average level of appearance (the sum of the levels on which the variable
appears, divided by how many times it occurs). In case of ties, then
3. The highest number of occurrences. In case of ties, then,
4. The highest priority in the order list when applying scheme 1.
Dynamic Top-down Weighted Ordering (Scheme 6)21
Scheme 5 is applied to a changing series of ‘don’t care’ fault trees, each of which is created
by deleting an allocated variable from the ‘don’t care’ fault tree following its allocation.
Weights are then reassigned to each modified fault tree to allocate another variable. The
process repeats until all variables are allocated.
Bottom-up Weighted Ordering (Scheme 7)22
Variables under gates are sorted according to Scheme 1 with a gate being explored first if it
has:
1. The highest weight. In case of ties,
2. The highest percentage of repeated variables (divide the total number of leaves by the
number of repeated leaves).
A gate’s weight is calculated according to the weight of its inputs:
1. The weight of an AND gate: WAND =
∏n
i=1 qi,
2. The weight of an OR gate: WOR = 1−
∏n
i=1(1− qi),
where qi is the weight of the i
th input of the gate. Basic event inputs are given a weight
of qi = 1/(mmax + 1), where mmax is the maximum number of failure modes related to any
variable.
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Event Criticality Ordering (Scheme 8)2324
Variables in a ‘don’t care phase’ fault tree (a mission failure fault tree where phase indices are
neglected) are ordered according to a version of Birnbaum’s structural importance measure,
modified to account for multiple failure modes. Firstly, the importance measure for each
component A in each of its failure mode i is calculated using:
I(Ai) = Q(1Ai ,q)−Q(0Ai ,q). (12)
Q(1Ai ,q) is the top event probability with probability 1 for event A
i, probability 0 for any
event Aj (i 6= j) and probability q = 1/(mmax+1) for any of the remaining events; Q(0Ai ,q)
is the top event probability with probability 0 for event Ai and probability q = 1/(mmax+1)
for any of the remaining events; mmax is the maximal number of failure modes experienced
by any component in the ‘don’t care phase’ fault tree.
The Birnbaums structural importance measure for component A is then calculated by:
I(A) =
mA∑
i=1
1
mA
∗ I(Ai), (13)
where mA is the number of failure modes in which component A can fail in the ‘don’t care
phase’ fault tree.
A component is ordered earlier if it:
1. Has the highest Birnbaums structural importance measure value. In case of ties;
2. Appears earlier in the “don’ t’ care phase’ fault tree in a top-down, left-right manner.
For all of the schemes, fault tree basic event inputs are considered before gate inputs
and if basic events or gates cannot be sorted using the principles of the schemes, those that
appear earlier, i.e. towards the top left of the fault tree, are given priority.
Appendix B: DEP-BDD Model
All of the existing variable ordering schemes can be used to order variables in a PMS at
a component level. The DEP-BDD model requires backward phase ordering and backward
failure mode ordering and considers ordering at phase level before at failure mode level.
The DEP-BDD model7 uses the following rules to compute the operation between two
nodes F = ite < x, F1, F0 > and G = ite < y,G1, G0 >. Supposing x ≤ y, and cp(x) and
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fm(x) are the component variable x relates to and the failure mode it fails in respectively,
then: F G = 
ite < x, F1 G1, F0 G0 > x = y
ite < x, F1 G,F0  L0 > cp(x) = cp(y), fm(x) = fm(y)
ite < x, F1  L1, F0 G > cp(x) = cp(y), fm(x) 6= fm(y)
ite < x, F1 G,F0 G > x 6= y.
(14)
where L1 = (G0)x=1 , L0 = (G0)x=0 is the first node with variable relating to a component
other than x encountered during a traversal down the 0-branches of the BDD starting from
G.
For a general node G = ite < x,G1, G0 >, where G1 = ite < y,H1, H0 > and G0 =
ite < z, I1, I0 >, the probability is calculated as follows7: P (G) =
p(x) ∗ P (G1) + [1− p(x)] ∗ P (G0) case 1
P (G1) + P (G0)− P (H0) + p(x) ∗ [P (K1)− P (G0)] case 2
P (G0) + p(x) ∗ [P (G1)− P (K2)] case 3
P (G1) + P (G0)− P (H0) + p(x) ∗ [P (K1)− P (K2)] case 4
(15)
where K1, and K2 are the first node with variable relating to a different component to x
encountered during the traversal down the 0-branch of node G1 and G0 respectively. The
cases for the relationships between x, y and z are:
case 1: cp(x) 6= cp(y) and cp(x) 6= cp(z).
case 2: cp(x) = cp(y), fm(x) = fm(y) and cp(x) 6= cp(z).
case 3: cp(x) 6= cp(y) and cp(x) = cp(z), fm(x) 6= fm(z).
case 4: cp(x) = cp(y) and cp(x) = cp(z), fm(x) = fm(y), pn(x) 6= pn(y) and fm(x) 6=
fm(z).
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